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In this interview Julian Reid, distinguished author and professor of International Relations at 
Lapland University Finland, elaborates on his use, continuation and alterations of Michel Fou-
cault’s work. Reid being his entire academic career – which includes the publishing of six books 
and co-editing the journal, Resilience: International Policies, Practices and Discourses – heavily in-
spired by Foucault, especially ‘the late Foucault’ efforts on analyzing liberalism, neoliberalism 
and its integral biopower, explicates – for the very first time – how his examination of the subjects 
from war to resilience and sustainability to imagination to political subjectivity relies on, contin-
ues and diverts from Foucault’s own thinking. By taking off in Foucault’s thinking, one of Reid’s 
ambitions – besides relentlessly criticizing illegitimate forms of use of power – has always been to 
push the borders of how we can think and create a healthy and justifiable human subjectivity.   
 
Kristian Haug: What is Foucault´s distinctive contribution to your analysis of discourses and 
practices of resilience?  
 
Juilan Reid: It’s his concept of biopolitics, which I take up, and apply to make sense of the emer-
gence of resilience as a discourse in international politics, especially in the field of development. 
When Foucault deployed the concept of biopolitics, in the 1970s, he was using it to look at the 
ways in which the biological life of human beings became politicized and utilized, from the 17th 
century onwards to his present, as a result of the distinctive approaches which liberalism took 
towards problems of governance. It seems to me that while that concept is still key to an under-
standing of the politics of our present, and the nature of neoliberalism, the life at stake in biopoli-
tics today has changed. It seems to me that liberalism no longer governs with a view to making its 
techniques of governance compatible with human life, but with non-human living systems. The 
human is now posed as a threat to the wellbeing of those systems rather than being positioned as 
an object of care. So there’s a shift in the order of biopolitics which has taken place, and which 
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Foucault was not able to see, because he’s not been around to witness it. I think that my work on 
resilience operates therefore as a kind of critical updating of his theory and analytic of biopolitics, 
which I believe to have been the major breakthrough in political critique of the 20th century, and 
which I have otherwise sought to update and inflect in other fields also, especially war. 
 
KH: What is Foucault´s distinctive contribution to your analysis of the dynamics between liberal-
ism, neoliberalism and the resilient subject?  
 
JR: Foucault’s analysis of neoliberalism, as he sketched it in his Birth of Biopolitics1 lectures, was 
very helpful for me in approaching and making sense of the forms of subjectivity this apparently 
new discourse of resilience is today producing. There is something new to resilience, in so far as it 
represents a shift in the order of biopolitics, but there is also something very classically liberal to it 
– which is that it preaches the incontrollable nature of the world, the powerlessness of the human 
subject, and the nihilism of living. Foucault found this type of liberalism in Condorcet, in Smith, 
and it is to be found in pretty much the entire range of liberal thinkers of the 18th and 19th centu-
ries; the basic idea that the world is a dangerous place, and that in being dangerous, it outstrips 
our capacities for security, leaving us, when we face up to the truth of it, to accept the reality that 
we can never hope to secure ourselves from it, and must instead get used to a life of adapting to 
continuously changing topographies of danger. None of these are attributes that we have tradi-
tionally been taught to ascribe to liberalism, but they are revealed as such by Foucault in his lec-
tures. So in that sense I have borrowed a lot from Foucault’s analytic of liberalism in order to pro-
vide the diagnosis which I have, of the relations which run through the entire history of liberal-
ism, leading to the contemporary natures of neoliberalism, and their causality in accounting for 
resilience and the resilient subject, as it were. Certainly, I believe, as Foucault did, that we won´t 
understand what neoliberalism is without grasping what liberalism is. And grasping what liberal-
ism is requiring us to look at it as a theory of subjectivity rather than simply a regime of political 
economy. This is something I draw out in my new book, written with David Chandler, called The 
Neoliberal Subject2, and which was published last year by Rowman and Littlefield.  
 
KH: In your previous work on war you criticize Foucault for failing to pursue the biopolitics of 
war to its limits and you develop the concept of biopolitical war quite far beyond where he left it.3 
You leave the reader in no doubt that liberal ways of war are biopolitical, in contrast with Fou-
cault’s more circumspect treatments of the relations between liberalism, war and biopolitics. Are 
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there further shortcomings you have encountered in Foucault’s work, and how have you re-
sponded to them? 
 
JR: Foucault’s projects were left full of open ends. And that was a deliberate ploy on his part. I 
don’t always think about them as shortcomings, even if, sometimes for the sake of rhetoric, I 
might describe them that way. They are often entrances, folds in the skin of the work, which al-
low me to penetrate further, deeper, and in new directions, making other spaces within the body 
of a given problem. But right now I’m working on developing a Foucauldian approach to images 
and imagination. Ideas about images and the limits and powers of the imagination run through-
out Foucault’s works from beginning to end. In fact his very first essay, published in 1954, was 
itself titled ‘Dream, Imagination and Existence’.4 The essay amounted not only to a scathing cri-
tique of psychological and especially psychoanalytical treatments of the image and imagination, 
as well as Sartre’s philosophy of imagination, but an argument for a revalorization of imagination 
as an experience of transcendental knowledge. The common assumption is that the essay was a 
starting point for a project he simply abandoned and moved on from. I disagree with that and am 
interested in how we can synthesize the various different elements of the theory of imagination 
buried in his work. He also wrote and spoke, at times, alluringly of his own desire for new forms 
of the critique of power; forms that would draw on the powers of imagination at the expense of 
its more customary armories. ‘A critic’ indeed of ‘imaginative scintillations’ rather than the sen-
tentious types which tend to monopolize the art of critique. Imagination runs right through Fou-
cault’s analytic of power as well as being at the center of his concerns when it came to thinking 
about the method of analysis itself, and thus the outside of power. On the one hand it can be ob-
served that the West has long since maintained a deep suspicion towards imagination, and that a 
good deal of Foucault’s work on the matter is dedicated to revealing the different ways in which 
that suspicion is sedimented in the regimes of power and knowledge he analyses. On the other 
hand, his own critique of power functions, by way of method, as a kind of un-masking. That is to 
say, it is itself immensely fuelled by a suspicion of the image of power, and desire to tear the 
mask from it to reveal the true face of power. The liberation of imagination requires a seemingly 
paradoxical hostility to the function of the image in the constitution of regimes responsible for its 
subjection. This latter recognition – the idea that power itself is fundamentally dependent on a 
deployment of imagination and the manifestation of a mask – is as important for a full under-
standing of the nature of Foucault’s critique. This applies especially to the struggles of individuals 
and collectivities with the powers of liberalism. The images liberalism manifests of itself, and 
those with which we identify, are the sources of our struggle with and against it, Foucault main-
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tains. Comprehending liberalism as a regime of power requires that we recognize, firstly, the un-
precedented scale of the imagination at work in its development, as well, crucially, as the function 
of its ability to mask itself in hiding the work of that imagination. Masking plays a crucial role in 
the political functioning of imagination. This is a feature of power that Foucault recognizes but 
ultimately fails to address. Foucault’s aims with respect to liberalism were precisely to un-mask it. 
To tear the mask which hid the intolerable face of liberalism behind it, and in a certain sense to 
show us the reality of its face. But such an approach to the mask of liberalism showed a certain 
naivety in understanding of the nature of masks themselves. A mask does not simply hide; it also 
displays, makes an image, and performs a presence. Even the face itself, beneath the mask, has to 
be addressed as a kind of image. The mask of liberalism in other words has to be addressed as a 
product, even the fundamental creation, of its own imagination; an expression of its own way of 
caring for itself. This is the great paradox of the function of the image in liberalism. It strips the 
image from its subjects, demanding that they care for themselves by telling the truth, living un-
masked lives, while caring for itself through the careful construction of an image which serves as 
a mask for itself. Masked, it also unmasks. Does one do justice to Foucault’s aspirations to ally 
imagination with critique simply by aiming, as he did, to strip the mask away from the subject of 
power, or is there another possibility?  Does the Foucauldian critique meet the criteria of critique 
he dreamed of himself? Is it a critique, in other words, of imaginative scintillation, or does it re-
main at the level of sententiousness? These are inviting shortcomings in Foucault’s work on imag-
ination I am now interested in exploiting. 
 
KH: What is the relation between your efforts towards creating a new ethics, which views the 
human as an irreducible being in its atmospheric–aesthetic–affective register5 – the poetic subject - 
and Foucault’s notions of aesthetics, care of the self, and his claim that the human has to create 
itself as a work of art? 
 
JR: As you know, Foucault’s approach to the aesthetics of subjectivity, and care of the self, has a 
long history, reaching back to the Ancient Greeks and the Romans where the latter practice origi-
nated. It was there among the Greeks and the Romans that this elusive concept of the self first 
made its emergence, as well as the notion that the self is somehow something dangerous. At least 
something which we have to care for, and work on, in order to ward off the dangers which it will 
otherwise pose for us, if it is left to live, unguarded as it were, within us. Technologies of the self 
described for the Ancients those practices by which the subject learns to move to the summit of 
itself, and to see the self by looking down, surveying it, and becoming its master from above, tam-
ing it, and rendering it conducive to his own needs. They are, in other words, tools of climbing, of 
ascent; an apparatus of ascension, by which we subject the self from on high, drawing the vertical 
                                                
5 Brad Evans and Julian Reid, Resilient Life: The Art of Living Dangerously (Cambridge (UK) and Malden (USA): 
Polity Press, 2014), 136. 




division between subject and self, becoming as subjects, a kind of summit, in submission of a self 
which is made to live in the valleys of our experience, as the sheep does when tended to success-
fully by the shepherd of its herd. Poetic subjectivity remains for me, fundamentally, the outcome 
of practices in support of the process of subjectivation by means of which we ascend to an imagi-
nary summit above our selves and submit the self to the mastery of our reason; a technique which 
links the faculty of imagination with that of reason, and enables reason to legislate.   
 
But I also maintain that within this practice there are numerous different methods of mobilizing 
both imagination and reason. Just as there were for the Ancients. The self, it is obvious, or it 
should be obvious at least, is an imaginary construct. We talk about it, discuss it, call it forth, as if 
it were real. As is necessary for all imaginary constructs which we desire to take seriously, and 
give weight and body to. That it is imaginary, and does not exist, is not in any way a sufficient 
condition for a critique of it. Few things seem to me more tiring than the criticism that because 
some thing does not exist in the real as it were that we ought to do away with it, no longer speak 
of it, or turn our attention elsewhere.  
You are familiar with Foucault’s critique of the critique of the state? Well suffice to say that 
what Foucault said of the state may as well be applied to the self. The fact that the self does not 
exist, that it is an imaginary construct, makes all the more important the weight of emphasis 
which it has been given within the western tradition, from the classical era onwards. In any case 
there is a vast difference between things that exist ‘in the real’ as my psychoanalyst colleagues are 
wont to say, and things that have reality or belong to the real. Between having and belonging and 
being-in there are also vast differences of relation to be discussed. To have reality is not the same 
as to be belong to reality, and neither having reality nor belonging to it have very much to do 
with being-in the real. What can we say, or what should we say, of the relation of the self to the 
real? Is the self something that has reality or belongs to the real? Or does it exist in the real, and if 
it exists in the real, who has and gets what? Is something that exists in something else also by ne-
cessity something that is had by that something else? You know in English we use this phrase to 
‘be had’, which I like very much.  To be had, when used as the English like to describe it, is not 
simply to be taken, consumed, or exist in the possession of something else. It is absolutely not a 
question of belonging to something else. If you have been had, au Anglais, you have been tricked 
and you have been conned. You have been taken in. By which I mean you do not simply belong to 
that which has taken you in. You have not entered into and become an internalized part of some-
thing that you were previously on the outside of. To be taken in is absolutely not a question simp-
ly of entering and becoming a part of something from the inside. For when you are taken in you 
are subject to the cruelest of double movements. You are, when taken in, led to exist on the out-
side-in.  
 
KH: Can you give an example? What is the price of our being taken in this way? 
 
Foucault Studies, No. 22, pp. 254-262 
 259 
JR: If you want to think of an example, think of Shakepeare’s Malvolio. Malvolio is had because 
he thinks he has. What is it to have? To have is the manner of being what one is not. It is to be the 
one who thinks he has entered, or who acts as if he has entered. One who is on the inside, and no 
longer the outside, because he has paid his entrance fee. He bears the ticket. He has gone from 
what Lyotard called the “over there not-this” to “the here the this”. He has travelled, traversed, 
made his way, from the over there to the here, I prefer to say, more simply. And it has cost him, 
this journey. He has paid his way.  It costs a great much to get from the there to the here, and as 
we all know, there is no going back, because one does not simply go, one is spat, out into the here 
where it has cost so much to arrive. So imagine Malvolio’s sense of the cruelty done to him when 
he realizes that to have he has been had and that in being had he does not have. This is the double 
movement by which one arrives at the outside-in. This is the double-movement through which 
every self is constituted. This is the double-movement, which makes Malvolios of us all. You 
know there is an interview somewhere where Fellini says something along the lines of ‘only en-
trance pays’. It costs nothing to leave. The space, which the western self inhabits is deliberately 
labyrinthine. Without walls, without doors, without windows, it nevertheless invites us in. And 
at each invitation, we pay the entrance fee. But we pay in the double sense with which Fellini con-
ferred payment upon entrance. We pay not simply to get in, but in being there. We pay in having 
entered. In being had and imagining that we have, we pay. What do we pay with, you ask? Yes, 
you are right, to pay there must always be a currency. Well, we pay with this mania for self-
knowledge, the very currency on which the economy of selfhood depends. The means, the only 
means that the self in question can be expected to pay his way around the labyrinthine space into 
which he has entered. These are the conditions of knowledge in which the poetic subject has to 
find its poetry. 
 
KH: In your latest book The Neoliberal Subject6 you end upon a discussion of the concept of politi-
cal imagination and express the need for the kind of work you are talking about now. How does 
this focus of yours on imagination emerge from your previous works on Foucault, or does it rep-
resent a break of some kind? 
 
JR: It emerges directly from where my work on resilience ends. It also represents a way of taking 
the critique of resilience into the directions that its limits demand. As a culture we are saturated 
today by discourses around the need to develop the self. The discourse on ‘the resilient self’ is a 
case in point. Leading psychologists of resilience claim responsibility not just for developing the 
concept from its psychological origins into the international political and social framework it has 
now become, but for the peace and reconciliation in former war torn countries where resilience is 
now said to exist. Within resilience, however, lurks another property and capacity of the self, that 
of imagination. Imagination is said by psychologists to play a crucial role in the recovery, for ex-
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ample, of human beings from traumatic experiences and their development of resilience. For 
abused children, especially, recovery and development is said to require the work of imagination, 
as hurt creates the images of a better future and the pleasure of such images becomes linked with 
painful realities, enabling them to withstand the present. It is even possible, some psychologists 
of resilience maintain, that the torment of the present heightens the need to imagine a future and 
thus increases the very powers and potentials of imagination itself. How, then, to theorize and 
understand the work which imagination performs on social and political scales? In my current 
work, I consider, critique and extend such psychological accounts of the function of imagination 
for the purpose of developing a better understanding of the politics of resilience. Images are, I 
argue, while untrue and in a certain sense inferior to the real, nevertheless things which human 
beings need in order to be able to act collectively upon the real, and to change the very nature of 
their political and social circumstances. While resilience provides scope for the function of imagi-
nation in enabling human beings to survive, it is nevertheless, as a discourse, also based upon a 
highly circumscribed imaginary, the limits of which are defined by survivability as such. Imagi-
nation can either contribute to the survival strategies with which human beings attempt to care 
for themselves in the face of ordeals and traumas, or it can, more ambitiously, seek to create an 
image of the self existing free from the possibility and necessity of a life of endless trauma and 
struggle.  It is this latter task that I believe deserves the greater exploration today.  
 
In this context I’m especially interested in taking on the dangers posed by neuroscience. For neu-
roscientists images are simply the tools with which we manage our survival in subordination to 
the creative forces of reality. Neuroscience has sold itself on the claim to be able to unveil the fun-
damental functioning principles of the brain and the central nervous system. But it is just another 
discourse with no more integrity than any other approach to imagination and human subjectivity. 
Neither the natural sciences nor the social sciences or the humanities can claim any greater or 
deeper grip on the real. I argue we need to challenge and reverse neuroscientific formulations of 
the relation of the imagined to the real; this notion of the functionality of imagination, of the re-
duction of the image to resource in a life of endless survival, and ultimately of the subordination 
of the image to the real. Images are of many kinds. In effect there is no such thing as ‘the image’ 
or ‘the imagination’ in the ways that neuroscience and its ideologues, so powerful today in the 
social sciences and in the framing of governmental policies, suppose. Instead we need a typology 
of the many different kinds of images that exist, and the many different types of movement of 
which imagination is capable. Most importantly we must recover the profoundly human power 
to subordinate the real to the image, such that it is made to conform to what we imagine. 
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of the journal Resilience: Policies, Practices and Discourses10 in 2013 and which was published, in 
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